

Asia-Pacific Counter-IED Fusion Center 2018 IED Activity Report



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About the APCFC

The Asia-Pacific C-IED Fusion Center is the premier center for irregular warfare analysis in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. The center develops and synchronizes C-IED and EOD programs and regional engagements. The center resources USARAPC C-IED training to ensure U.S., Allied, and Partner Nations survivability.



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
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
Year at a Glance — 2018

The Indo-Pacific region experienced 1175 IED events in 2018: 821 events in South Asia, 347 events in Southeast Asia, and seven events in Northeast Asia. These events consisted of 4035 devices. There were 537 IED detonation events, 240 IED found and cleared events, 24 IED hoax events, and 375 IED cache events. There were 1072 casualties in 2018: 89 civilians killed, 667 civilians wounded, 65 host nation forces killed, and 251 host nation forces wounded.

There were 1175 IED events and 1072 casualties in the Indo-Pacific region in 2018



Icons depict events for December 2017 - December 2018



This document is intended for those personnel performing military, intelligence, law enforcement, or security duties in support of C-IED operations.


2018 Executive Summary

Indo-Pacific IED Data: January 2018—December 2018								
Detonation Found/Cleared Hoax Cache Total								
Device Count	931	745	33	2326	4035			
Event Count	536	240	24	375	1175			

SOUTH ASIA

There were 821 IED events in South Asia in 2018. 68% of these events occurred in India (561 events), which was more than the rest of the South Asian countries combined. This pattern is within historical norms, though there were a much higher number of events in India in 2018 compared to 2017 (561 versus 410). This is primarily due to the deterioration of the security environment (see Annual Summary). Bangladesh experienced higher than normal numbers in 2018 as the result of the December elections in addition to the on-going counterterrorism fight against Jama'at-ul Mujahideen and Ansar al-Islam. Nepal's number of IED events decreased significantly in 2018, though they were still higher than historical norms for much of the year. Lastly, despite a contentious election process, the Maldives successfully transitioned to a new government without an IED violence reported.

South Asia IED Events January 2018 - December 2018




South Asia IED Data: January 2018—December 2018							
Detonation Found/Cleared Hoax Cache Total							
Device Count	751	603	26	1945	3325		
Event Count	383	167	16	255	821		

Southeast Asia IED Events January 2018 - December 2018

SOUTHEAST ASIA

There were 347 IED events in Southeast Asia in 2018, as compared to 430 in 2017. The elevated activity in 2017 was primarily due to the Marawi Siege in the southern Philippines and a large coordinated attack in May 2017 in southern Thailand. In the Philippines, the continuation of martial law as a response to Marawi throughout 2018 (and continuing into 2019), in addition to on-going efforts of counter-terrorism forces to combat extremists, has likely contributed to a reduction in violence. In southern Thailand, the number of IED events was slightly lower than the previous year, and the number of coordinated attacks in 2017 and 2018 were comparable.



Southeast Asia IED Data: January 2018—December 2018								
Detonation Found/Cleared Hoax Cache Total								
Device Count	177	142	6	380	705			
Event Count	Event Count 150 73 7 117 347							


NORTHEAST ASIA

There were seven IED events in Northeast Asia in 2018, which is a slight decrease from 2017 (8). The majority of events occurred in China, with personal grievances against the government or society acting as the most common motivation. VEO activity is very uncommon across this region, and there were no attacks attributed to VEOs reported in 2018.


IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from OPEN SOURCES are not confirmed; statistics should be considered approximations. Event refers to specific IED activity categories: IED Detonation, IED Found/Cleared, IED Hoax, IED Cache.

2010-2018 Data

INDO-PACIFIC IED EVENTS & CASUALTIES 2010 - 2018




2018 Significant Events Timeline




NOTE: The APCFC Monthly IED report includes both event counts (detonation, found/cleared, hoax, and cache) and device counts. It is important to note that a singular IED event may include multiple devices. For instance, a single IED cache event may contain several devices.

IED Activity - Past 12 Months

Switch Type




Group Affiliation



The chart above depicts the Number of IED events attributed to a specific VEO from December 2017 to December 2018

IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations. Graphics represent known switch type and group affiliation.

Suicide Attack Activity in 2018



Indo-Pacific Region End of Year Review

Overview

Internal conflict compounded by regional security issues, political violence, criminal activity, and the continued use of the IED as the primary armament by violent extremist organizations characterized the 2018 Indo-Pacific irregular warfare threat environment. Regionally, the displacement of approximately 600,000 Rohingya refugees and the continued embracing of the ISIS ideology by Islamist groups, specifically in the Philippines and Bangladesh, continued in 2018, perpetuating violence and instability in several countries. Indonesia and Bangladesh witnessed the re-emergence of al-Qa'ida affiliated organizations (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur in Indonesia and Ansar al-Islam in Bangladesh), highlighting the resiliency of these groups and the difficulties associated to contending with multiple, militant threats. Similarly, following a lull in activity, extremists escalated their violent actions in Jammu and Kashmir, which included a corresponding increase in IED use to target security forces. Elections, particularly in India and Bangladesh, prompted an intensification in IED and other violent activities by radical political activists and militants to intimidate rivals and to dissuade civilians from voting in an attempt to undermine the political processes. In 2019, Indo-Pacific VEOs will continue to use and likely improve on their ability to employ IEDs as security forces intensify their efforts to dismantle and neutralize militant networks. More concerning is the continued experimentation and possible adoption of new technologies by VEOs, to include small-unmanned aerial systems and advanced switch mechanisms, which are available via commercial sources.

South Asia

Bangladesh

Bangladesh experienced 140 IED events in 2018, as compared to 117 events in 2017. Month-to-month, IED events have remained consistently elevated since the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in 2016, largely due to an increase in anti-militancy operations throughout the country. Ongoing drives against militant hideouts have led to an increase in IED cache recoveries and a decrease in the number of detonation events. This is particularly impactful when comparing IED events from the last national election in 2014 (507 detonations versus 30 caches recovered from December 2013 to January 2014) with the election in 2018 (29 detonations versus eight caches recovered in December 2018).



Protestors vandalizing a police vehicle, November 2018

October 2018 was a significant month for the threat landscape, as Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and its ISIS-aligned offshoot Neo-JMB, demonstrated their continued relevance through violent activities. On 5 OCT, a raid on a JMB hideout in Mirsarai, Chattogram ended with the detonation of two suicide vests and the recovery of multiple IEDs, bomb making equipment, bulk chemicals, firearms and other weapons (see graphic). The militants were reportedly planning an attack on the Chattogram Courthouse. Later in the month, police conducted "Operation Gordion Knot" against two hideouts of Neo-JMB operatives in Narsingdi, Dhaka. The operation resulted in two militants killed, including Neo-JMB's media Chief Abdullah al-Bengali, and two militants detained. Caches recovered at the sites included explosives, IEDs, and documents. Interrogations of the two detained militants indicated that JMB/Neo-JMB are active and have been using social media and other online platforms for communications and recruitment.

Despite historical election volatility in Bangladesh, 2018 remained relatively peaceful. Though widespread violence did occur, it did not approach the same scale of the 2014 election, or the follow-on protest of the government in early 2015. Ties between some political parties (or former political parties) with Islamist organizations have contributed to IED violence in previous elections, so Bangladesh's security forces aggressive stance towards militancy likely helped reduce IED activity during this election cycle. Another key reason violence was lower during the 2018 election is the decision on the part of opposition parties (specifically the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and its allied groups) to participate in the election and not boycott it as they did in 2014. Despite concerns over the legitimacy of the election because of widespread arrests of BNP activists and candidates in November and December, it appears the BNP remains committed to engaging in the democratic process. Likewise, violence against minority communities was lower in the 2018 election than in previous years as well, though lingering fears of violence remain commonplace in villages where Islamist groups (especially Jammatelslami) operate.

With the election of the Awami League and its leader, Sheikh Hasina, back into office, Bangladesh is set on a course to continue secular governance and increase engagement with the international community. The reduction in extremist violence over the last couple of years, coupled with increasing stability of the government and

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political sphere, bode well for Bangladesh's commitment to improving the day-to-day living conditions of its people through economic development. **Dhaka Tribune** (11/11/18) **PRI** (11/14/18) **Dhaka Tribune** (12/26/18) **Daily Star** (12/27/18)

<u>India</u>

In 2018, India experienced an overall deterioration in its security environment. Contributing factors included the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir adopting the use of IEDs, attacks from external militant organizations, and Maoist activity intensifying in Chhattisgarh despite overall strategic successes for Indian security forces in the Red Corridor. Overall IED activity increased from 410 events in 2017 to 561 events in 2018; split almost evenly between increased IED detonations and IED caches recovered, though violent election periods in West Bengal, the northeastern states, and Chhattisgarh contributed to an increase in the number of detonation events. Likewise, the number of casualties increased by approximately 100 this year, with increases among both civilians and security forces.

While the Maoist insurgency remains the overall largest source of IED activity, 2018 saw regular IED use in Jammu and Kashmir for the first time since 2015. Notably, Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) only claimed conventional attacks, while a revitalized Jaish-e Mohammed (JeM) claimed responsibility for IED attacks. Though the frequency is relatively low, events have continued throughout the year.

At the end of January, India experienced a high-profile attack against the Dalai Lama by elements of the Jaish Mohammed India (JMI), a re-branded JMB network in India. Salauddin Salehin, an established JMB leader who is motivated by solidarity for the Rohingya, coordinated the event. Of note, this was the first known deliberate attack by JMB elements in India, which typically use the regions surrounding Bangladesh as logistical safe havens. Though India appears to have dismantled the JMI network, the large JMB presence retains an operational capability that can target India.

In January and February, Indian security forces captured Indian Mujahideen (IM) members attempting to revitalize the group's operations in India. IM senior leadership remains in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, so the group is capable of regenerating given enough time and motivation. Similarly, India has experienced an increasing number of Sikh plots in Punjab that are likely supported by external agencies.

Though the northeast continued to experience militant activity, the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) appears to have collapsed following the death of their leader Sohan Shira in February. Additionally, in August the National Socialist Council of Nagaland Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) removed Khaplang's chosen successor, Khango Konyak, and installed Khaplang's nephew Yung Aung, who is reportedly highly trained and qualified. The transition occurred shortly after the Burmese government annulled a decades-long ceasefire that afforded the NSCN-K a safe haven for their operations in India. As a result, their future and that of the groups in their sphere of influence is unclear.

Overall, 2018 presented many security challenges to India; however, positive indicators suggest the Indian government is building capabilities that will lead to future stability. Neutralizing emerging threats such as the Sikh insurgency, JMI, IM, and ISIS will likely lead to improved security in the coming year. **New Indian Express** (1/6/18) Radio Free Asia (2/2/18) NDTV (1/22/18) Indian Express (2/14/18) Times of India (4/6/18) Hindustan Times (11/2/18) Times of India (2/24/18) Hindustan Times (8/19/18) The Week (7/28/18)

Southeast Asia

Philippines

In 2018, the Philippines experienced 202 IED events, a decrease from the number of IED events in 2017 (231). The threat landscape in 2018 was much more stable compared to 2017, primarily due to the conclusion of the Marawi Siege and the corresponding degradation of Islamist militant networks in the southern Philippines. The two most significant IED events of 2018 were the suicide vehicle-borne IED (SVBIED) attack on 31 JUL in Basilan (see graphic) and the night market bombing on 28 AUG in Isulan. A Moroccan national and ISIS ideologue executed the SVBIED attack, which resulted in 11 killed and seven injured. This event was unique because suicide attacks have never occurred before in the Philippines. Additionally, security forces identified six Malaysian foreign fighters involved in plotting the attack and constructing the SVBIED. This highlights the continued presence of Southeast Asian and possibly, other foreign fighter elements operating in the Philippines. The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) perpetrated the night market attack during an annual festival, which resulted in three deaths and 37 injuries. Both events caused significant casualties and property damage and, more concerning, indicate a possible shift in targeting from security forces to civilians.

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The New People's Army (NPA) and BIFF were the violent extremist organizations responsible for the majority of IED events in 2018. The NPA remains a constant threat through their attacks revolving around a desire to overthrow the government and to establish a Maoist-style communist regime. Authorities recognize the enduring hazards posed by the NPA and desire change through localized peace talks, which are anticipated to occur in 2019. Throughout the year, security forces effectively neutralized a large majority of Islamist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Maute Group in Mindanao, but have not fully eradicated the threat. In 2018, security forces killed or arrested 1740 terrorists in the southern Philippines and a small number surrendered voluntarily, with the majority originating from ASG and the Maute Group. Despite decades of turmoil and disagreement, the relationship between the MILF, MNLF, and the government has finally achieved a point of prospective peace and stability following the signing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), which went into effect on 26 JUL. The BIFF, a breakaway faction from the MILF since 2008, desires complete Moro independence, not just autonomy through the BOL, and will most likely continue to conduct harassing attacks into the new year. Overall, no one group gained significant traction this year and most likely will not while martial law remains in effect in 2019.


An impoverished population, the dense jungle vegetation that facilitates militants' freedom of movement, and a lack of government resources to address the underlying social and economic problems will continue to plague the southern Philippines. Government officials, to include President Duterte, foresee some instability in the southern regions in 2019 due to the scheduled general elections for the House of Representatives and Senate on 13 MAY 2019, as well as the continued enduring rehabilitation efforts in Marawi. The growing impatience of the Maranaos, the predominantly Muslim tribe living in Lanao del Sur, to move back to Marawi could lead to a rise in local discontent towards the government and result in pockets of extremism that take advantage of these sentiments. Channel News Asia (8/29/18) CNN (7/31/18) The Diplomat (6/1/18) Phil Star (12/10/18) CNN (7/24/18) The Guardian (5/22/18) The Defense Post (11/5/18) The Defense Post (12/24/18)

Thailand

Thailand IED activity dropped slightly, from 92 events in 2017 to 86 IED events in 2018. There was also a significant decrease in casualties from 250 in 2017 to 102 in 2018. The decline in violence in southern Thailand is consistent with the overall trend since the insurgency began 15 years ago. The South has experienced occasional spikes in violence, despite the relatively low levels of IED attacks. These events appear reactionary in nature, and are often a direct response or disproval of towards the Thai government's lack of progress with the peace talks.

On 22 JAN, a timed VBIED detonated at a food market in Yala, killing three civilians and injuring 34. Those responsible were a combat wing of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) known as the Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK). Although the device was consistent with normal Southern Thai Insurgency (STI) TTPs, the targeting of civilians with no ties to the government is less common.

On 15 MAY, rangers identified a sUAS flying above a security post in Yaha, Yala. Authorities suspect that the drone was conducting reconnaissance for the grenade attack that occurred approximately one hour later. Officials later confiscated the suspected sUAS at a residence for flight data analysis. This event was the first reported of its kind in southern Thailand and could possibly be an emerging TTP that could reappear, particularly because commercial



Significant attacks in Thailand, 2018

sUAS platforms are easily accessible. Days later, militants conducted a coordinated attack on 20 MAY, which was the cause of a spike in IED activity in 2018. Militants conducted a complex attack on the fourth day of Ramadan after evening prayers, involving approximately 20 detonations across Narathiwat, Yala, Songkhla and Pattani. Coordinated attacks continue to be one of the most effective TTPs used by southern insurgents to create public unrest, to discredit security forces, and to maximize damage to infrastructure. In June and July, several 1-

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2kg VOIEDs detonated at rubber plantations; authorities suspect Thai Buddhists were the targets as the plantation owners were Buddhist.

Though IED events are steadily declining, the nature of attacks this year appear to be much more calculated and sophisticated. The attacks and devices focused more on quality than quantity, hence the consistent implementation of less frequent, but better planned, coordinated attacks. Successful implementation of some security measures mitigated the southern threat in 2018. For example, it appears the 2017 ban on metal gas cylinders weighing over 15kg led to a decline in their use as a container in 2018. Though events with gas cylinders still occur, the use of this previously pervasive container type has declined significantly. Southern insurgents often implemented uncommon TTPs in 2018, such as insurgents wearing women's attire to avoid detection to conduct IED attacks or criminal activity, and it is likely that southern insurgents will continue to develop new and inventive ways to conduct operations in the coming year. Bangkok Post (1/22/18) Bangkok Post (5/15/18) Bangkok Post (5/15/18) The Irrawaddy (12/11/18) Benar News (12/17/18)

Burma

Burma experienced low IED activity in 2018 (23 events), a decrease from 62 events in 2017. The decrease in overall events is likely attributed to a decline of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) activity and the use of conventional explosives (rather than IEDs) in the northern conflicts. Ongoing turmoil between VEOs (comprised of armed ethnic groups (AEGs)) and the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw) has increasingly destabilized the regions of Rakhine, Shan, and Kachin. During clashes between AEGs and the Tatmadaw, both sides commonly use explosives to target each other. Civilians, however, often become the victims of these detonations.



RCIED recovered following the Sittwe bombing, February

In 2018, the TTPs observed illustrated an evolving IED threat landscape. In the 24 FEB coordinated attack in Sittwe, Rakhine security forces recovered more sophisticated, directional fragmentation RCIEDs for the first time. The devices weighed 36 pounds, incorporated an equilateral-trapezoid shaped container, and included fragmentation plates made of out a sponge with glued ball bearings and scrap metal. Prior to this event, similar RCIED TTPs were observed in Kachin State. This likely illustrates TTP transfer in the region, as the Arakan National Council (suspected attackers) is allied with organizations in the Northern Alliance. Interest-

ingly, this TTP emerged in September in India. Information sharing between different AEGs across boundaries is evident and these linkages could have a significant impact on the overall threat environment.

The political and military atmospherics in 2018 have also directly contributed to the instability in Burma. 25 AUG marked the one-year anniversary of the ARSA's attacks on 30 police posts in Rakhine in 2017 that caused the Tatmadaw to respond harshly. The result was a mass exodus of over 720,000 refugees into Bangladesh. In a report released on 27 AUG by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), the report used the testimonies of 875 Rohingya victims and other supporting documentation to call for the prosecution of top Burmese military generals for crimes against humanity and war crimes in Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan. Authorities planned to start repatriating a limited number of vetted Rohingya Refugees in early November 2018; however, they postponed repatriation efforts until 2019 after officials discovered that selected families refused to return to Burma. The Rohingya's reluctance to return stems from their fears of renewed violence and will only return if the government addresses their demands. Outside of Rakhine, ethnic minorities in Kachin and Shan states have also accused the Tatmadaw of conducting similar war crimes. Since 2011, fighting between the Tatmadaw and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has displaced over 100,000 civilians in Kachin and northern Shan, drawing international attention and condemnation. All of these issues will likely continue to affect the threat landscape and stability in Burma in the coming year. Scoop (8/28/18) The Daily Star (8/28/18) The Irrawaddy (8/28/18) The Daily Star (8/28/18) Relief Web (8/29/18) The Daily Star (8/26/18) United Nations (8/28/18) Eleven Myanmar (3/4/18) Mizzima (3/1/18) al Jazeera (11/22/18) The Irrawaddy (11/19/18) Strategy Page (11/15/18) Radio Free Asia (10/16/18)

Indonesia

Indonesia experienced 21 IED events in 2018, nearly the same amount of activity it experienced in 2017 (22). Although the total number of events are near equal, 2018 proved to be a pivotal year for both terrorism issues and counterterrorism efforts in Indonesia. Continuing into 2018, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) remains the primary driver of both terrorist and the corresponding IED activity in the country. In fact, the organization was responsible for 82% of IED events this year, including the Surabaya family suicide bombings in May (see graph-

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ic)

The Surabaya bombings, which killed 28 and wounded 57, marked a watershed moment in Indonesian terrorism. Not only were the bombings the deadliest attack since the 2002 Bali Bombings, it was the first known instance that militants employed women and children to conduct suicide bombing missions in Indonesia. Furthermore, it was the first time that entire families participated in coordinated, militant attacks.

The Indonesian government's response to the Surabaya attacks was swift and extensive. Two weeks after the bombings, Indonesia moved to pass the long-awaited update to their 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law. The 2018 update provides Indonesian authorities with the ability to hold terror suspects longer in detention before levying charges, increases penalties, and improves Indonesia's ability to prosecute terrorist sympathizers and affiliates.

The government also responded by initiating efforts to neutralize JAD operational activity. Within a few days of the bombings, the government commenced a series of unremitting raids against JAD cells in Surabaya and the greater East Java region. Authorities arrested many of the East Java JAD leaders, and killed several others. Between May and late August, the government arrested and charged 170 JAD militants, and killed 21 more in police operations. Additionally, in July, Indonesia prosecutors moved for the first time to convince a Jakarta court to label JAD as a terrorist organization.

Despite the police crackdowns and the incarceration of JAD leaders, the VEO remain a potent force; a quality that is unlikely to change in the near term. JAD's decentralized nature provides the group with this resiliency. Although JAD organizes itself territorially across Indonesia into regions, branches, and cells, their loose organization allows the subgroups to operate independently. In fact, many attacks, to include the Surabaya bombings in May, may have been conceived at the individual cell level. Authorities estimate JAD possesses 1,000 fighters, strong operational capabilities, and maintains an active presence in 18 out of 34 provinces. RSIS (6/2018) Understanding Conflict (10/2018) Combatting Terrorism Center (7/2018) Al Jazeera (5/25/18)

Northeast Asia


China

China experienced six IED events in 2018. This is a slight increase from 2017 (five). In 2018 there were three detonation events (compared to two in 2017). IED activity in China is consistently low, with the vast majority of events caused by personal protests against the government and society. One of the detonations in 2018 was an attack on a bus, in which the perpetrator carried an IED onto a public bus potent enough to cause major damage and casualties (June: 15 casualties); there was also an unknown explosion on another bus in December that caused 17 casualties, but it is unclear if the perpetrator used an IED. In an unusual event in July, a perpetrator threw an improvised firecracker at the fence of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. In Hong Kong, the Organized Crime and Triad Bureau raided several Chinese Triad locations and discovered detonators, a fuse, firearms, and ammunition. A police summary of IED cache events occurring in 2018 in Hainan Province notes the discovery of 2,884 kg of explosives and 192 detonators. Police did not attribute any of the IED activity to VEOs.

Throughout 2018, the Chinese government actively pursued policies that sought to contain and control Muslim populations in both the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and elsewhere. In Ningxia province, Chinese authorities threatened to demolish the newly built Grand Mosque, but later delayed the demolition following widespread protests and condemnation by religious leaders. In XUAR, Chinese authorities claimed that oppressive population control measures (re-education camps, biometrics population tracking, and in-house monitoring) were necessary to quell extremism, despite international condemnation for the government's activities. Outside of China, however, extremists targeted Chinese interests several times over the last few years. For instance, in August 2018 in Pakistan, Baloch militants attacked a bus of Chinese engineers, and in November 2018, they attacked the Chinese consulate in Karachi, Pakistan with suicide vests and small arms. Militants likely conducted these attacks in protest of development plans related to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

There have been several reports of Uyghur Muslims of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) training with VEOs in Syria and Afghanistan. A recently formed Uyghur-majority VEO, Katibat al Ghuraba al Turkistan (KGT), posted online videos of the organization training with the Malhama Tactical Group in Syria. Chinese authorities fear that these VEOs will employ their enhanced militant skills in China and thus, use this as justification to oppress the population in XUAR. However, population controls in XUAR and Ningxia province may backfire and ultimately increase popular support for VEOs in China. LWJ (1/18/18) Guardian (7/26/18) BBC News (10/10/18) TOI (10/10/18) LWJ (11/5/18) SCMP (11/27/18) NYT (12/19/18)

December Indo-Pacific IED Events



IED reporting and casualty statistics derived from open sources are not confirmed; statistics are presumed to be approximations

December Executive Summary

IED events in December increased from 90 in November to 105 in December. These events consisted of 309 devices. There were 174 casualties in December: five civilians killed, 151 civilians wounded, two host nation forces killed, and 16 host nation forces wounded. Though there was a drop in the number of devices in December (down from 410 in November) there was a large increase in casualties (72 in November). December's increase in IED events and casualties was primarily due to election violence in Bangladesh, a large coordinated attack in Thailand, and an attack occurring at a shopping mall in the Philippines.

In South Asia, there were 76 IED events in December: 44 detonation events, 11 found/cleared events, and 21 caches recovered. These events consisted of 249 devices. There were 103 casualties in December: three civilians killed, 111 civilians wounded, and one host nation forces killed. Events in December were only slightly higher than in November (71 events), but casualties were much higher than November (68 casualties). The primary factor accounting for the increase in events and higher casualties in December was elections in Bangladesh, during which both militant organizations and legitimate political parties used or attempted to use IEDs to intimidate rivals and voters. IED events in India dropped from 62 events in November to 35 events in December, and numbers remained consistently low in Nepal.

In Southeast Asia, there were 27 IED events: 17 detonation events, five found/cleared events, and five caches recovered. These events consisted of 60 devices. There were 59 casualties in December: two civilians killed, 40 civilians wounded, one host nation forces killed, and 16 host nation forces wounded. Events increased in December from 19 in November due to a large coordinated attack in southern Thailand, where unknown militants targeted power poles and statues at a tourist beach. Targeting power infrastructure is a common TTP used by southern Thai insurgents. December IED events in both the Philippines and Burma both decreased from the previous month. Casualties in the Philippines contributed to the overall increase in December due to the attack at the Cotabato Shopping Mall by militants on 31 DEC, which killed two and wounded 34 civilians.

South Asia: December Significant Activity

Bangladesh

In the first week of December, Dhaka Metropolitan police arrested Golam Hossain Liton (alias Boma Liton), a notorious bomb maker. Liton had reportedly participated in 50 IED attacks since 2003 and was part of a criminal gang involved with explosives smuggling and mercenary bombings. Police uncovered that political activists and militant extremists would pay Liton between USD 60 and USD 240 to detonate IEDs. **Daily Star (12/11/18)**

On 10 DEC, Dhaka Metropolitan Police's Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC) unit arrested two Ansar al-Islam (formerly Ansarullah Bangla Team, ABT) members for plotting to kill filmmaker Khijir Hayat Khan. The pair had reportedly followed Khan to his home village with the intent to kill him over the release of his movie, "Mr. Bangladesh," which they felt was anti-Islam and anti-Jihad. Following the release of a hit list in 2013, ABT operatives killed several writers, bloggers, publishers, and minority activists for their views. This activity largely dissipated; however, the murder of secular publisher Shahjahan Bachchu in June 2018 indicates a possible resurgence. **Daily Star (12/12/18)**

A Bangladesh-based Human Rights Support Society report tallied the total number of casualties and arrests related to the national elections made between 1-25 DEC. The report indicates that nine civilians were killed and 3,420 civilians (including political candidates, activists, and bystanders) were wounded. An additional 28 police officers and 28 journalists were also wounded. Of those detained, 2,068 were Bangladesh National Party activists, 522 were Jamaat-e-Islami activists, and 11 were Awami League activists. The report found at least 972 distinct incidents of political violence for the reported period. **Daily Star (12/29/18)**

A telephone conversation leaked to the media allegedly between BNP leader Mosharraf Hossain and an alleged Pakistani ISI operative, Mehmood, appears to indicate that the BNP wanted ISI to sway the 30 DEC election in their favor. BNP and Jel/ICS have long been associated with Pakistan based on their support during the 1971 War of Liberation. In the call, Hossain reportedly asks the ISI agent for help, to include the receipt of funds from China, to sway the election. In response to the phone call, a politician from the ruling Awami League has filed a case to charge Hossain with sedition. BD News 24 (12/13/18) Dhaka Tribune (12/23/18) Dhaka Tribune (12/24/18) Dhaka Tribune (12/25/18) Asian Tribune (December 2018)

India


On 4 DEC, India's National Investigation Agency (NIA), the agency established by the Indian government to combat terror in India, requested that the French government grant access to LeT terrorist, Muhammad Usman Ghani. Ghani, a Pakistani national, is an alleged suspect in the 13 NOV 2015 Paris attacks, during which gunmen and suicide bombers simultaneously attacked a concert hall, a major stadium, restaurants and bars, killing 130 people. The NIA hopes to obtain information about LeT leadership and the 2011 Mumbai attacks from the proposed questioning of Ghani. Ghani was reportedly a bomb maker for LeT. India and France signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which India hopes will facilitate closer cooperation in the matter of Ghani. Indian Express (12/4/18)

On 6 DEC, India's state Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) implicated members of the Hindu nationalist organizations, Sanatan Sanstha and Hindu Janjagruti Samiti, of having established a terrorist organization to target critics of the Hindu religion. The alleged terrorists were reportedly planning to target the Sunburn Music Festival in Pune in December 2017 with IEDs and petrol bombs. The ATS recovered bombs and explosives from the property of Sanatan Sanstha member Vaibhav Raut and 11 others in Nalasopara in August 2018. Moreover, police have arrested Sanatan Sanstha members several times for bombings in Vashi, Thane, Panvel in 2007, Goa in 2009, as well as for three murders between 2013 and 2015. **Times of India (12/6/18)**

On 14 DEC, some 200 representatives from DRDO laboratories, Indian Army, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), local police, and various other security agencies attended a two-day workshop titled *National Workshop on Explosives Detection* (NWED). One of the primary discussions focused on a joint effort to develop a single device, applying a myriad of technologies, which security forces can use to detect all varieties of explosives. A significant component of the workshop was the introduction of a trace explosive detection device, OPX-Revelator, which is an optronic trace explosives detector that reportedly identifies more than 25 explosives widely employed by militants in IEDs. **Times of India (12/14/18)**

On 27 DEC, the Indian government banned the Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) due to its reported involvement in killings and bombings in India. The KLF is a militant group attempting to create a Sikh homeland called Khalistan (the current state of Punjab), via armed struggle. The KLF was responsible for bombings of civilian targets in India in the 1980s and 1990s, sometimes in conjunction with Kashmir separatists. Between February 2016 and October 2017, the KLF was involved in eight attacks targeting Hindu nationalist leaders and a Christian pastor. The government submits that KLF members are receiving financial and logistical support from handlers based outside of India. The ban will enable the government to disrupt the group's funding, recruitment, and training activities. **The Indian Express** (12/27/18)

Bangladesh: December IED Events



There were 29 IED detonation events, two IED found/cleared events, and eight IED cache events.

On 12 DEC, Dhaka Metropolitan Police recovered an IED cache following the arrest of three JMB militants in Kamalapur, Dhaka. The cache contained 30 IED containers, 1 kg of explosives, detonators, 30 commando knives, and other bladed weapons. The JMB operatives were reportedly planning a series of attacks in Cox's Bazar during the election and New Year celebrations. **Daily Star (12/13/18)**


On 18 DEC, an IED detonated at an election rally for a Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal candidate in Bheramara, Kushtia, Khulna, wounding 12 civilians. **New Age BD (12/18/18)**


On 26 DEC, two crude bombs detonated at the residence of a politician and the attackers then fired blank rounds at the house in Cougaccha, Gangni, Meherpur, Khulna. The IED reportedly incorporated glass marbles as enhancements. **Dhaka Tribune** (12/27/18)


IED activity increased significantly in December, primarily due to national elections on 30 DEC. Bangladesh National Party activists are likely responsible for many of the events, though Awami League activists and others also engaged in the widespread violence. In addition to IEDs, beatings and street brawls occurred regularly throughout the month, injuring hundreds of people. In the coming month, IED activity may remain elevated as fallout from the election continues, particularly if the opposition protests the election results.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Davies Count	Month	118	10	0	42	170
Device Count	Year	201	21	0	303	525
Event Count	Month	29	2	0	8	39
	Year	67	7	0	67	141


Past Year IED Events by Type







India: December IED Events



There were 14 IED detonation events, eight IED found/cleared events, and 13 IED cache events.

On 1 DEC, an IED detonated on a passenger train near Harsinga station in Assam, injuring 11 passengers. Authorities suspect the United Liberation Front Independent (ULFA-I) conducted the bombing; however, the ULFA-I denies responsibility. There has been an uptick in ULFA-I activity in Assam since the November elections. **Business Standard** (12/2/18) Times of India (12/1/18) The Shillong Times (12/2/18)


On 22 DEC, a joint team of Rajputana Rifles and police recovered a significant cache of explosives in a forest in Tinsukia, Assam. Militants were reportedly planning to target security forces and government facilities in Margherita. The cache contained six slabs of TNT, 800 grams of gunpowder, 600 grams of RDX, four meters of fuse wire, and three detonators. **Nagaland Post (12/22/18)**

On 26 DEC, India's National Investigative Agency recovered an IED cache at 17 different locations in New Delhi and Uttar Pradesh and detained 12 suspected militants from the ISIS-inspired organization, Harkat-ul-Harb-e-Islam. The cache contained 51 pipes, 25kg of explosives, an improvised rocket launcher, 112 alarm clocks, suicide vest


materials, batteries, mobile phones, remotes for a car and doorbells, electronics, wires, ammunition, firearms, and other items. Authorities determined the militants were in the advanced stages of preparing to attack highly populated areas in and around New Delhi. **Economic Times (12/26/18) Huffington Post (12/26/18)**

Overall IED and VEO activity in India decreased slightly in December, after a spike in November due to assembly elections in five states affected by Maoist/Naxalite activity. Despite this, India's most significant IED event of 2018 occurred on 26 DEC when the NIA disrupted the largest ISIS attack plot to date in India and recovered caches from 17 locations. A dozen suspected terrorists detained by authorities confessed that they had been radicalized online and had international handlers. Authorities suspect the group was loosely structured and without material support from ISIS core, which suggests that ISIS does not yet have a significant enough presence in India to conduct large-scale attacks. It is likely that other similar, loosely organized cells will continue to plan such attacks. The NIA surveilled the group for approximately three months prior to the arrests.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Davies Count	Month	16	16	0	45	77
Device Count	Year	534	546	5	1656	2741
Event Count	Month	14	8	0	13	35
	Year	285	120	5	188	598



Nepal: December IED Events




There was one IED detonation event and one IED found/cleared event.

On 4 DEC, Nepal Army EOD and police found and cleared a pressure cooker IED on the grounds of a youth center in Khalanga, Sharada, Salyan, Rapti. Authorities believe the IED was a war remnant. **Insec Online (12/5/18)**

On 9 DEC, a VOIED detonated in Bhagwanpur-4, Siraha, Sagarmatha, wounding two civilians. The perpetrators concealed the IED in a box and it reportedly detonated when the victims attempted to open the package. **Insec Online** (12/9/18)

IED activity remained low for the fourth consecutive month, indicating that the overall increase of activity witnessed over the last two years is likely abating. This could be due to a multitude of factors, but a reduction in political violence is probably the key reason. Previous months with high activity (such as November to December 2017) were the result of elections and corresponding political violence. VEOs that had been increasing operations in Spring 2018 also appear to have reduced their overall levels of violent activity, at least for the time being. In the coming months, there may be another surge of violence as the weather warms and on-going political issues linger.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Davisa Count	Month	1	1	0	0	2
Device Count	Year	118	91	23	10	242
Event Count	Month	1	1	0	0	2
	Year	89	81	13	9	192



Southeast Asia: December Significant Activity

Philippines

The Philippine Congress officially extended martial law on 12 DEC, which will continue throughout 2019. The comprehensive assessment provided by the military and the police to President Duterte suggests that militant activity will continue to persist from both Islamist VEOs and the NPA. While there is opposition to the extension, the majority of residents in Mindanao are satisfied to have security forces remain. The Guardian (5/22/18) The Diplomat (6/1/18) The Defense Post (11/5/18) Global Times (12/5/18) Manila Standard (12/7/18) Rappler (12/12/18)

The Communist Party of the Philippines celebrated their 50th anniversary on 26 DEC. This celebration highlighted that the majority of the same factors that enticed members to join in 1968 are still present today. The groups said in a statement that it would suspend all attacks on the military from 24 DEC to 26 DEC and 31 DEC to 1 JAN 2019 in unity with the Filipino people's observance of the traditional holidays. Although the government has dismissed the declaration and expressed that they will not reciprocate the truce, there has not been any retraction or changes to their statements. In an effort to combat the continual violence, the president signed Executive Order 74 on 4 DEC that created a national task force to end the communist armed conflict through localized peace talks and the implementation of social services. **ABS (12/19/18) Rappler (12/11/18) Forbes (12/5/18) Business Mirror (10/3/18)**

Thailand

On 11 DEC, in an official statement, the Election Commission stated that Thailand would hold a general election on 24 FEB 2019. The statement came shortly after the Junta lifted the ban on political activity. With the ban lifted, political parties can resume operations such as campaigning. **The Irrawaddy (12/11/18)**

Leaders of the BRN continue to refuse to join the Malaysia-brokered peace talks, despite the pressure that Malaysia has placed on the group. Abdul Rahim Noor, the new Malaysian facilitator for the peace talks, issued the BRN an ultimatum: join the peace talks or leave Malaysia. Authorities suspect that BRN leadership has been taking refuge in Malaysia. BRN sources stated that the group wants to strengthen its bargaining position before it considers negotiating with the Thai government. **Benar News (12/6/18)**

On 20 DEC, insurgents conducted a coordinated small arms attack at three security bases in Yala. The first attack was at the Lam Mai Police station in Muang, where the suspects launched the attack from a nearby rubber plantation. Approximately, 10 minutes later, in Bannang Sata, insurgents attacked a civilian defense post and an army base in Yaha. Coordinated attacks targeting security forces is a common southern Thai insurgency TTP. According to sources, the attacks occurred after authorities received a tip that Koseng Latehyama, an active insurgent in the area, was mobilizing men for small arms and IED attacks on security checkpoints and other vulnerable targets. **Bangkok Post (12/22/18)**

Burma

From 3 to 6 DEC, clashes between members of the Arakan Army (AA) and the Tatmadaw took place in Buthidaung and Rathedaung, Rahkine, resulting in casualties for each organization. On 3 DEC, a clash killed four AA soldiers and an unreported number of military personnel; the AA ambushed the soldiers while they were conducting clearance operations. On 6 DEC, a landmine detonated, killing two along a road in Rakhine State where the Tatmadaw and the AA have fought previously. The following day, EOD officers recovered and defused another mine. Radio Free Asia (12/7/18) The Irrawaddy (12/7/18)


On 16 DEC, an unknown group launched a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attack on the Tatmadaw in Rathedaung, Rakhine, striking a logistics truck. The attack resulted in the deaths of three soldiers and the wounding of 10. The event occurred near Kyauk Tan, which is an area frequently disputed by the AA and the military. **The Irrawaddy (12/20/18)**

On 24 DEC, unknown assailants murdered the founder of the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD), U Khin Than Maung, at his residence in Kyar Inn Taung village in Rakhine. Social media posts blamed the AA for his death; however, authorities have not released a report following the investigation of the murder. **The Irrawaddy (12/26/18)**

Indonesia

On 31 DEC, Indonesian police and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) militants engaged in a 30-minute firefight in a remote mountainous area of Poso, Sulawesi. Police travelled to the area to retrieve a decapitated body of an individual recently killed by MIT militants. Police were in the process of moving the body when MIT militants fired upon them, wounding two police officers. From 2015-2016, Poso was the site of a joint military-police operation conceived to neutralize MIT. Indonesian authorities assert that there are only a handful of MIT fighters left, currently led by Ali Kalora. **Xinhua (12/31/18) Metro TV News (12/31/18)**

Philippines: December IED Events



There were four IED detonation events, one IED found/cleared event, and four IED cache events.

On 7 DEC, military forces discovered an IED cache at an abandoned NPA camp in Minuli, Caranglan, Nueva Ecija, Central Luzon, Luzon. The cache contained three IEDs, five blasting caps, detonation cord, 13 cell phones, two batteries, and a variety of weapons and ammunition. **PhilStar (12/9/18)**


On 19 DEC, an IED detonated along a roadside in Hinatad, Catarman, Northern Samar, Eastern Visayas, Samar as a military patrol passed by. A five-minute firefight with NPA members erupted after the detonation occurred, resulting in six injuried. This event occurred after the holiday truce declared by the CPP and demonstrated the illegitimacy of the truce for the AFP and PNP. **Manila Times (12/20/18)**


On 31 DEC, an RCIED detonated outside the South Seas Mall complex in Magallanes St., Cotabato, Maguindanao, Soccsksargen, Mindanao killing two and injuring 34. After the detonation occurred, authorities found and cleared a second IED on the second floor of the mall. The device incorporated a disintegrated slide switch, an improvised blasting cap, alley wires, and enhancements (half-inch nails and metal ball bearings). Police and military currently have not yet identified any suspects, but have linked similar IED signatures to the BIFF, Maute Group, or Daulah Islamiyah. Possible motives include protesting the

upcoming final ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law or retaliation from any one of the groups for attacks by the military. Rappler (12/31/18) Manila Times (1/2/19)

IED activity in December was lower than November, with some of events being caches in the southern Philippines perpetrated by the NPA. The continuous decline in events is likely due to the holiday season and the looming presence of the military, as it prepares for another year of martial law. The plebiscite for the BOL will take place on 21 JAN 2019, and is expected to result in an improved relationship between the government and both the MILF and MNLF. With an ongoing military presence in Mindanao, analysts anticipate the continued use of IEDs as the primary weapon of choice by both Islamist and Communist organizations to exert territorial dominance and to attempt to maintain operational relevance.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Davisa Count	Month	4	1	0	7	12
Device Count	Year	76	58	3	214	351
Evant Caunt	Month	4	1	0	4	9
	Year	72	45	3	91	211





Thailand: December IED Events



There were 12 IED detonation events, and four IED found/cleared events.

On 24 DEC, a roadside cooking gas cylinder RCIED detonated in Bacho, Narathiwat. The device weighed approximately 25kg and targeted a passing security forces patrol. After the detonation, the suspects engaged in small arms fire, killing one police officer and wounding five others. **The Nation (12/25/18) Bangkok Post (12/25/18)**

On 26 DEC, a coordinated attack occurred in three places in Songkhla. Two devices detonated 10 minutes apart on Samila Beach, damaging two sculptures that sit 200 meters apart. Around the same time, two IEDs detonated damaging two high-voltage power poles in Khuan Niang. EOD officials also found and cleared four IEDs in Bang Klam. Bangkok Post (12/27/18) The Star (12/27/18) Malay Mail (12/27/18) Bangkok Post (12/27/18)


On 28 DEC, suspected Barisan Revolusi Nasional insurgents conducted a coordinated attack across three districts of Narathiwat. In Si Sakhon, two RCIEDs detonated injuring four civilians. In Chanae, four RCIEDs exploded by roadside power poles. Officials discovered 6 IEDs in Chanae and Tak Bai. A roadside IED detonation also damaged a power pole in Tak Bai. Bangkok Post (12/29/18) Channel News Asia (12/29/18) Benar News (12/28/18) Malaysiakini (12/28/18)

Thailand experienced a high volume of IED activity towards the end of December. Though officials have not revealed a suspected motive for the attacks, there are likely multiple factors responsible for the spike of violence. One likely cause was to create pubic unrest for the approaching New Year's celebrations, which has been a common Southern Thai Insurgency (STI) TTP during holiday observations. Another possible factor

was the refusal of young insurgents to support peace talks with the Thai government (see SEA SIGACTS).

2019 will likely experience an overall increase in IED activity. In the south, the driving force behind the violence will most likely be fueled by ongoing friction involving the peace talks. 4 JAN 2019 marks the 15th anniversary of the start of the insurgency, which will likely continue until the STI and Thai government can effectively begin negotiations with Malaysia as the facilitator. In the coming months, attention will shift back to Bangkok where elections are fast approaching (see SEA SIGACTs). Political activists and protestors are likely to organize demonstrations during this time. Previous periods of political upheaval, such as the 2014 coup, saw an increase in IED activity, and this may similarly occur during the scheduled election season.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
LIEVICE COLLINE	Month	19	28	0	0	47
	Year	79	50	1	50	180
EVANT ('Alint	Month	12	4	0	0	16
	Year	63	19	1	9	92



Burma: December IED Events



There was one IED cache event.


On 28 DEC, security forces recovered a cache of explosive material after carrying out a raid in Fet Lat Pyin, Maungdaw, Rakhine. The cache contained fuse wires, two capacitors, and 15 used combat boots. Three suspects escaped the raid.


Myanmar Times (1/1/19)

In December, IED activity dropped to one event for the month, down from three in November. According to an executive of the Arakan National Party, local villagers have experienced more frequent gunfire and explosions; however, there has been limited reporting to confirm if any of the events involved IEDs. It is important to note that biased media reporting and government censorship have often affected the portrayal of the threat landscape in areas of conflict. Likewise, reporting uses the terms "landmine" and "IED" interchangeably, which presents a challenge when attempting to determine if devices are in fact improvised.

2019 may experience an unstable beginning since the Tatmadaw declared its first unilateral, four-month ceasefire in all conflict zones in north and northeast Burma. The Tatmadaw's aim is to rebuild trust with armed ethnic groups (AEGs) who have and have not yet signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). The military also wants to establish a relationship with the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC). Lastly, they aim to encourage non-signatories (those who engage in frequent clashes), to sign the NCA by the end of April 2019. Though the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire is an attempt by the military to reach peace and stability, ongoing clashes in Rakhine with the AA may undermine those efforts. In a recent statement made by the Northern Alliance, the member groups will not participate in the peace negotiations while the Tatmadaw continues their attacks against the AA. This ongoing conflict could result in a negative response from AEGs, leading to an increase in overall violence, to include IED activity.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Device Count	Month	0	0	0	0	0
	Year	17	17	0	7	41
Lyont ('ount	Month	0	0	0	1	1
	Year	14	6	0	7	27





Malaysia: December IED Events





There was one IED detonation event.

On 31 DEC, police responded to an IED detonation near a jewelry store in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. There were no casualties; however, the blast ripped open the front security gate of the store. Police believe the attackers may have used the bombing to facilitate a burglary, although the jewelry store reported no items were missing. **NST** (12/31/18)

IED activity in Malaysia is relatively uncommon compared to its regional neighbors. However, when Malaysia encounters IED activity, it is usually of a criminal nature. The 31 DEC bombing of a jewelry store in Sabah appears to conform to this trend. The last VEO related IED event in Malaysia occurred in October 2017.

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Davisa Count	Month	1	0	0	0	1
Device Count	Year	10	0	1	0	11
EVANT CALINT	Month	1	0	0	0	1
	Year	6	0	1	3	10





Northeast Asia: December Significant Activity

China

Uyghur Extremism in Syria

In December 2018, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) (also known as the Turkestan Islamic Party), reportedly declared Idlib, Syria as a caliphate; a symbolic demonstration of their operational presence in Syria. As Uyghur extremists strive to increase their presence and activities in Syria, Chinese authorities' previous statements in 2018 concerning potential military operations to quell Uyghur jihadists in Syria are even more prescient. The implication is that China would act to stop Uyghur jihadists before they could return to China. Almasdar News (12/4/18) Prensa Latina (12/7/18) Eurasia Review (8/6/18)

China-India

On 22 DEC, China and India concluded the joint counter-terrorism exercise HAND-IN-HAND 2018. China hosted the seventh iteration of the exercise, which involved training and exercising in cordon-and-searches, raids, intelligence collection, and joint interoperability. Each participating nation also conducted integrated live fires and hostage rescue operations, as well as shared urban and jungle operations best practices. **Daiji World (12/22/18)**


Korean Peninsula

In December 2018, in accordance with peace initiatives and efforts between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK), troops from each country crossed the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and conducted inspections of demolished guard posts. In addition, both sides conducted some demining operations over the final three months of 2018. The joint stated goal, according to the ROK Defense Ministry, was to remove all landmines (some two million) buried along the 155 mile-long DMZ, in particular, clearing in the Joint Security Area by year's end. Once the DMZ is clear of mines, recovery operations for all Korean War remains could begin. **DW News (10/1/18) Voice of America (12/12/18)**



December 2018—DPRK and ROK soldiers greet each other at the DMZ

China: December IED Events




There was one IED cache event.

In December 2018, police released a summary report of a year's worth of illegal firearms and explosives cache recoveries conducted in Hainan Province. In total, the caches contained 2,349 homemade shotguns, air guns, and nail guns; over 12,500 rounds of ammunition; 2,884 kg of explosives and 192 detonators. There were 80 separate investigative cases and 178 suspects arrested during these cache discoveries. Police emphasized that despite these high metrics, this was actually a decrease from 2017 cache recovery numbers. **Xinhua** (12/7/18)

IED activity remained low in China, consistent with historical norms. The crackdowns on caches of illegal explosives and firearms in Hainan Province, as well as similar police raids in Hong Kong, likely dissuade, but do not eliminate, nefarious activities by criminal and extremist organizations. Unfortunately, other police crackdowns in Muslim-majority regions of China may serve to undermine these security efforts. Though not reported as an IED event, there was an unknown explosion on a bus in Leshan City, Sichuan in December, wounding 17 civilians. The attack was the second attack on a bus in 2018: in June, an IED detonation injured 15 people. Media did not report the events in December and June as terrorist attacks, as they follow the pattern of personal protest attacks (attacks that serve as an expression of an individual's animosity towards the government or society).

		Detonation	Found/Cleared	Hoax	Cache	Total
Davisa Count	Month	0	0	0	0	0
Device Count	Year	3	0	1	0	4
Frant Caret	Month	0	0	0	1	1
Event Count	Year	3	0	1	2	6





IED Calendar

The IED calendar was established to help our audience maintain awareness of events, such as anniversaries of major attacks, or political, religious or cultural events that often coincide (or can potentially coincide) with a spike in IED events.

6 DEC 1992 (IND): Babri Masjid

Mosque Destruction

14 DEC (IND): ULFA Revenge Day

16 DEC (BNG): Victory Day

22 DEC (IND): CPI-M Military Wing

Anniversary

25 DEC (IND): Christmas Attack

Anniversary

30 DEC 2018 (BNG): National Elec-

tions

4 JAN (BUR): Independence Day

26 JAN (IND): Republic Day

Late January to early February (WW): Attacks have coincided with the anniversary of worldwide

protests to Danish Cartoons in 2006 **28 FEB (THA):** First time Thai Gov-

ernment and insurgents sign a

peace agreement

	S	M	a spike in IEI T	W	Т	F	S
	25	26	27	28	29	30	1
Dec	2	3	4	5	6 IND	7	8
December 2018	9	10	11	12	13	14 IND	15
2018	16 BNG	17	18	19	20	21	22 IND
	23	24	25 IND	26	27	28	29
	30 BNG	31	1	2	3	4 BUR	5
January 2019	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
y 2019	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
	20 WW	21 WW	22 WW	23 WW	24 WW	25 WW	26 WW IND
	27 WW	28 WW	29 WW	30 WW	31 WW	1 WW	2 WW
F	3 WW	4 WW	5 WW	6	7	8	9
February 2019	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
2019	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
	24	25	26	27	28 THA	1	2

IND – India

PHL – Philippines

BNG - Bangladesh

BUR - Burma

THA - Thailand

NEP - Nepal

WW - Worldwide

Common Terms and Acronyms

AN - Ammonium Nitrate

ANFO - Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil

ARMM - Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

CIV - Civilian

CBRN - Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

COIN – Counter-insurgency

CWIED - Command Wire IED

DTMF - Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency

EFP - Explosively Formed Projectile

EOD - Explosive Ordnance Disposal

F/C - Found & Cleared

HME - Homemade Explosives

HN - Host Nation (Police, Military, Government)

IDF - Indirect Fire

IDP - Internally Displaced Persons

IED - Improvised Explosive Device

KFR - Kidnap for Ransom

KIA - Killed in Action

LOC – Line of Communication

LPG - Liquefied Petroleum Gas

MSR - Main Supply Routes

NFI - No Further Information

NSTR - Nothing Significant To Report

PBA - Post Blast Analysis

PBIED - Personnel Borne (Suicide Bomb) IED

PCB - Printed Circuit Board

PN - Partner Nation

PPIED - Pressure Plate IED

QRF - Quick Response Force

RCIED - Radio Controlled IED

RCP - Route Clearance Patrols

RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade

SA - South Asia

SAF - Small Arms Fire

SEA - Southeast Asia

SVBIED - Suicide Vehicle Borne IED

TATP - Triacetone Triperoxide

TNT – Trinitrotoluene (C7H5N3O6)

TTP - Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

UXO - Unexploded Ordnance

VBIED - Vehicle Borne IED

VEO – Violent Extremist Organization

VOIED - Victim Operated IED

WIA - Wounded in Action

Governments, Groups and Organizations

ASG - Abu Sayyaf Group

BIFF - Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters

BIPP - Barisan Islam Perberbasan Patani

BRN-C - Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate

BSF – Border Security Forces

BNP - Bangladesh National Party

BriMob - Mobile Brigade (Indonesia CT Forces)

CPI-M - Communist Party of India (Maoist)

CPN-M – Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

CPP - Communist Party of the Philippines

CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force (India)

GMIP - Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Patani

HM - Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

HNLC – Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council

HUJI-B - Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami Bangladesh

IB - India's Intelligence Bureau

IM - Indian Mujahideen

IrW – Irregular Warfare

ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)

ISIS - Islamic State of Iraq ash Sham

JAT - Jemaah Ansharout Tauhid

JI - Jemaah Islamiya

JTMM – Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha

JIB - Jemaat-e-Islami Bangladesh

JeM - Jaish-e-Mohammed

JMB - Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh

JMJB – Jama'atul Muslim Janta Bangladesh

KIA - Kachin Independence Army

KIM - Khalifa Islamiya Mindanao

KIO - Kachin Independence Organization

LeT - Lashkar-e Tayyiba

MILF - Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MILF-SOG - MILF-Special Operations Group

MNLF - Moro National Liberation Front

NPA - New People's Army

PNP - Philippine National Police

POLRI – Indonesian National Police

PULO - Patani United Liberation Organization

RAB – Rapid Action Battalion (Bangladesh)

RKK - Runda Kumpulan Kecil

SJMM - Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha

SJTMM - Samyukta Jana Tantrik Terai Mukti Morcha

ULFA – United Liberation Front of Assam

UWSA - United Wa State Army

YCL -Youth Communist League